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MEMORANDUM

This paper [redacted] addresses itself primarily to developments within the Soviet armed forces during the period October 1952-December 1953. Its purpose in chronologically summarizing these developments is to place in perspective the position of the military within the context of the new Soviet leadership. It should be regarded as a working paper. Valuable contributions have been made by many parts of CIA and other intelligence agencies. The views expressed are the views of the authors, however, and do not represent the official views of the Agency. As in the case of the previous papers in this series, suggestions and criticisms will be welcomed.

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POLITICS AND THE SOVIET ARMY

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POLITICS AND THE SOVIET ARMYSummary and Conclusions

The Soviet armed forces do not have a history of successful interference in internal political crises as a single, organized element of power. Their heritage includes a tendency toward fragmentation and inaction during internal crisis. Military freedom of action is restricted by the interlocking networks of political officers and security police operating within the ranks, by a tendency toward conformity among officers and men alike, by a growing officer caste system, and by the presence in the ranks of a high percentage of Communists subject to Party discipline. Unless the existing controls break down under drastic circumstances, the armed forces as a whole must be looked upon as a relatively passive and non-monolithic body with regard to a Soviet succession crisis. This study of the post-Stalin period is undertaken to discover what effects recent political changes have had on the armed forces as a whole and on individuals or groups among the high-ranking military leaders, and what influence these military leaders have exerted within the government.

During the year from October 1952 to October 1953, the political position of Soviet military leaders progressed through several phases. From the XIX Party Congress until Stalin's death, there were some indications of the participation of military leaders in political maneuvering, as evidenced by Govorov's belated designation as a candidate member of the Central Committee and by the naming of military officers in the Doctors' Plot announcement. The period of the post-Stalin struggle between Malenkov and Beria, from March until June, was a time of outward passivity on the part of the military leaders, with an increase in political control over them, indicated primarily by the reorganization of the ministry of armed forces and the return of Bulganin as minister. The re-emergence of Zhukov, probably considered by the Party leadership as a safety measure at a critical moment, gave increased influence to an outspoken professional officer.

A shift from a passive toward a more active role of the military in politics probably occurred beginning with the East German riots and the Beria purge. The armed forces apparently participated in the removal and denunciation of Beria, and the present Party leadership probably bought military acquiescence or support by giving the professional military men greater freedom within their own establishment. After June, some high officers of the armed forces

were promoted, professional officers were placed in important security assignments, and greater consideration was given to a military point of view regarding questions of morale and security in the armed forces. The political position of the Soviet military leaders appeared better than it had for several years previously, and an uneasy alliance was probably maintained between top professional officers and Party leaders.

Developments of the winter of 1953-1954 have tended to confirm the impression that the political influence of Soviet military leaders has increased. The prominence of Konev on Beria's trial board in December 1953 and the apparent participation of Vasilevsky in decisions affecting the MVD in early 1954 suggest the greater importance of the military leadership in the formulation of Soviet governmental policy.

I. Position of the Military Prior to Stalin's Death

Role of the Military at the XIX Party Congress:

The point of departure of this study of recent events affecting the Soviet armed forces' political position is the XIX Congress of the Communist Party, held in October 1952. It was a milestone in Soviet history, the first Party Congress to be held for thirteen years. The position of the military leadership had been relatively stable for several years prior to the time of the Congress.

The Congress itself produced little change in the position of the leaders of the Soviet armed forces. Routine speeches were made by Marshal N. A. Bulganin, then Politburo member with general responsibility for military affairs, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, then Minister of War, and by the heads of the political directorates of the Soviet Army and Navy. Stalin's praise was loudly proclaimed by these leaders as by all others, and the themes of Western aggression and the need for vigilance were emphasized. The high percentage of Communists in the army was asserted by Vasilevsky, who claimed that 86.4% of all officers were Party or Komsomol members. The authority of commanders as compared with that of political officers, a subject on which the Soviet leaders have long been unable to make up their minds, was mentioned by Vasilevsky, who announced that, in recent years, the commanders' position had been further strengthened.^{1/}

Military representation in the highest Party body did not increase; even the enlarged Presidium included only Bulganin and Marshal K. Y. Voroshilov. The proportion of military men elected as full members of the second highest Party body, the Central Committee, showed a definite decrease in comparison to the percentages elected at the XVIII Party Congress in 1939 and the XVIII Party Conference in 1941. A slight proportional decrease in military representation on the candidate membership list in contrast to that of 1941 is also evident.

^{1/} For details see Leo Gruliov, ed: Current Soviet Policies, the Documentary Record of the 19th Party Congress and the Reorganization After Stalin's Death; New York 1953.

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Military Officers Elected to the Central Committee

	<u>Full Members</u>	<u>Percentage of Total</u>	<u>Candidate Members</u>	<u>Percentage of Total</u>
1939 Congress	11	15.5	10	14.7
1941 Conference	9	12.7	15	22.0
1952 Congress	7	5.6	22	20.0

Members and candidate members elected at the XIX Party Congress included a virtually complete roster of the high command of the Soviet armed forces, including the commanders of certain key military districts and field forces, such as the Belorussian, Kiev, Moscow and Baltic MD's, the Forces of the Far East and the Group of Occupation Forces, Germany.^{1/}

Bulganin and Voroshilov, although included as military men here, are really "political generals." They are "old Bolsheviks" who were close associates of Stalin and are primarily representatives of the top political hierarchy. Bulganin's experience prior to World War II was that of a Party trouble-shooter; his military service during the war was as a Party representative on the Military Councils of the various fronts and as a member of the State Defense Committee. Voroshilov was a high military officer during the civil war period and later attained the positions of Defense Commissar and Politburo member, but his generalship proved inadequate in the Finnish campaign and in the early stages of World War II; his subsequent continuance in high military positions is generally considered to be the result of his political connections. Other examples of "political generals" include A. S. Shcherbakov, wartime head of the Chief Political Directorate (now deceased), and L. I. Brezhnev, head of the Navy's Political Directorate during 1953; both these men rose through the Party ranks rather than the military ranks.

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commander of a military district is also quite generally a member of the Party buro in the area of his post. Men who rose through the military ranks but who have been elected to the Party's Central Committee include Marshals I. S. Konev, A. M. Vasilevsky and V. D. Sokolovsky.

The first of a series of peculiar events involving military personalities occurred two weeks after the publication of the list of Central Committee members at the close of the Party Congress. On 30 October 1952, a special announcement was made by the Party Secretariat to the effect that Marshal L. A. Govorov had been elected a candidate member but had been omitted from the list through an oversight. Such an error is almost unheard of in the USSR, in view of the importance of these listings, so that the explanation given can scarcely be accepted. It has been suggested that Govorov's belated appointment indicates that he represented a faction which had been side-tracked at the Congress but had begun a strong fight to regain its position immediately afterwards. Govorov, Inspector General of the Soviet Army since January 1947, is one of a very few ex-Czarist officers now active.^{1/} He was closely associated with Zhdanov in the defense of Leningrad during World War II and was one of four chief orators at Zhdanov's funeral in September 1948, speaking on behalf of the Ministry of Armed Forces.

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have presented strong evidence of rivalry and enmity between Zhdanov and Malenkov during the immediate post-war period, and it is generally agreed that Malenkov dominated the XIX Party Congress. If Govorov, as a remnant of the Zhdanov group, was passed over at the Congress, he must have had exceedingly powerful backers to have had his name added to the list.

The Doctors' Plot--Military Victims:

The announcement of the Doctors' Plot on 13 January 1953 is generally considered to have been a warning to some individuals or groups who were contesting the political status quo in the USSR. Because it cast doubt on the past effectiveness of the MGB during a period when Beria held responsibility for security affairs, and since it attempted to fix blame for Zhdanov's death, the Doctors' Plot announcement has been viewed as an intended blow at Beria, engineered with Stalin's blessing by a group which may have included Malenkov.

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- 1/ Of the living Soviet officers of marshal or equivalent rank, only Govorov, Rokossovsky and Fleet Admiral Isakov (who is now retired) are known to have held commissioned rank in the imperial service. There are many high-ranking Soviet officers, however, the record of whose early careers is not available.

The two "victims" listed in the 13 January announcement were former Politburo member A. A. Zhdanov, and A. S. Shcherbakov, who headed the Army's political administration from 1942 until his death in 1945. All five men listed as "intended victims" of the plotters were career military officers. It is generally believed that the story of the plot contained very few, if any, real facts. There must have been some calculated reason, therefore, for naming Marshals Vasilevsky, Konev and Govorov, General Shtemenko and Admiral Levchenko as intended victims, with the implication that the vigilance of the new leadership of the MGB had only just saved their lives from being "shortened." At the time of the announcement, Vasilevsky was Minister of War of the USSR (War and Navy were separate ministries). Konev was or had been Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces.^{1/} Govorov was probably Inspector General, Shtemenko was the recent Chief of the General Staff, and Levchenko was a recent Deputy Minister of the Navy, probably in charge of training. It is possible that they were named simply as representatives of the Soviet armed forces--a branch of government known to be popular with the Soviet people--in order to gain the people's sympathy or the sympathy and support of the members of the armed forces. This group does not seem to be fully representative of the armed forces, however: no air officer was included, the naval officer was not particularly well-known, and several army officers better known than Govorov and Shtemenko could have been chosen. It seems more probable, therefore, that the five potential victims were selected as representing a faction or factions needing to be warned that their lives were under the protection of the Party and the MGB and could be "shortened" if they did not stay in line.

^{1/} It is now considered quite likely that Konev was no longer Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces at the time of the Doctors' Plot announcement. Konev was first suspected to be in Lvov, possibly as commander of the Carpathian Military District, when he was elected to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party in September 1952. There have been frequent reports of his presence in the western Satellite area; the importance of the Carpathian MD is increased because of its proximity to this area. He was nominated as a candidate to the Supreme Soviet from the Lvov Oblast in February 1954. The former commander of the Carpathian Military District, Col. Gen. K. N. Galitski, was probably transferred in the fall of 1952 to the Odessa Military District, which he currently commands.

There is little in common among the military leaders named in the Doctors' Plot announcement. Govorov is certainly the most controversial figure: in addition to his connections with Zhdanov, in 1948 he was chairman of a military board that tried Fleet Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, Soviet Navy chief during World War II, on charges of giving secret information to the Western Allies. (Kuznetsov was demoted to Rear Admiral and retired. He returned to his old post after July 1951.) Admiral Levchenko was one of the other two members of that board. Marshal Vasilevsky, Minister of War prior to the 1953 reorganization, is believed to be a highly capable staff officer, who served in the Stavka under Zhukov during World War II and therefore had been quite close to Stalin. It has not been possible to identify Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, or Konev with any particular political faction within the Soviet hierarchy, although the first two were members of the honor guard at Zhdanov's funeral and all three had been close associates in the military ministry at Moscow after 1948.

The careers of the military men named in connection with the Doctors' Plot have been followed with some interest during subsequent months. Govorov has continued to receive attention befitting his rank and assignment at important occasions; he seems never to have suffered any loss in prestige. Vasilevsky was replaced as Minister in connection with the governmental reorganization in March; he was made a First Deputy Minister, however, and has shared the honors of this post with Zhukov ever since. Konev was not listed as participant in an official function or signatory to an obituary for some months after serving as a member of the honor guard at Stalin's bier, but his name reappeared on an October obituary and he was chairman of the tribunal which convicted Beria of treason in December. Levchenko may have suffered temporary difficulties and apparently was long absent from the Moscow scene, returning only last fall. During the year from September 1952 to September 1953, he appeared at only one official function in Moscow (a reception in May 1953), whereas previously his appearances had been quite frequent. He has since attended Moscow functions held by the North Koreans, Mongolians, Chinese and Bulgarians, and it is possible that he was in the Far East during his absences from Moscow. The fifth "victim," General Shtemenko, had almost certainly been relieved as Chief of the General Staff of the War Ministry prior to the XIX Party Congress, although he was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee at that time. He was seen in Berlin in October 1952 and attended the Soviet Army Day reception there on 23 February 1953; on that date, he stood next to Chuikov, the Soviet commanding general in Germany, and was said by a Soviet officer to be a "kind of deputy" to Chuikov. The invitations to

Army Day in Moscow that year were signed by Marshal Sokolovsky as Chief of the General Staff. Shtemenko has not been identified since.^{1/}

The Death of Stalin:

The Doctors' Plot announcement ushered in a period of extreme tension within the USSR, marked by a wave of intensified "vigilance" propaganda which continued until after Stalin's death. The publicity accompanying Army Day on 23 February 1953 took an especially belligerent tone, stressing the liberation role of the Red Army in World War II.

On 17 February, there appeared in Izvestia a cryptic announcement which further suggested that all was not well in the Kremlin. The commandant of the Kremlin Guard announced the "untimely death" two days previously of Major General P. E. Kosynkin, who was not further identified. The only other paper to mention his death was the Army publication Red Star, which carried a statement by a group vaguely designated as "a Group of Comrades;" this provided the

^{1/} A note on the use and significance of official listings of Soviet military leaders seems in order here. Soviet publications practically never announce the relief of an officer and his replacement by another. This is similar to the lack of information about changes of post in other branches of the government which led one writer to complain that, when the top brass in the Kremlin fall out, it is like watching a dogfight under a blanket. The Russians seem to inform each other of changes, however, by rearranging names as they appear in various official listings of celebrations and receptions, and on notices and obituaries. It is believed that this is done to inform those Russians who have learned to read between the lines about the essential facts of Soviet leadership. The absence of a man's name from a list on which it should appear does not necessarily mean that he has been removed from his post. It may indicate that he is temporarily away from the town where the list is datelined; but the complete absence of a name from any lists for a period of months, together with a lack of any other identification during the same period, raises a legitimate question as to the fate of the individual.

information that Kosynkin had died suddenly and that he had been in responsible military work from 1938 "to the last days of his life." Practically nothing is known about Kosynkin's background. He entered the Red Army in 1921 and had been a Party member since 1925. The possibility that he switched to the MVD or MGB is suggested by his appearance in 1944 on a list of promoted Red Army officers, most of whom have been identified as MGB or MVD personnel. It seems almost certain that, at the time of his death, he was a member of the Kremlin Guard, an organization subordinate to the MGB.

The announcement of Stalin's death on 5 March 1953 thus came in a period of extreme tension in the Soviet Union, permeating all walks of life including the armed forces, with evidence of serious infighting among the top leadership. The peculiar incidents occurring in the period after the XIX Party Congress suggested that some persons or groups in the armed forces were involved in the infighting, to an extent not revealed by the available information.

It is evident that the removal of Stalin from the scene was followed by a period of deadly struggle among Soviet political leaders. An uneasy Malenkov-Beria-Molotov triumvirate emerged upon Stalin's death. Concentration of power in Malenkov's hands after he assumed chairmanship of the government was reduced when he "resigned" as Secretary of the Party shortly thereafter, precluding any immediate bid for one-man leadership. The government took some steps to ease international tension and adopted a series of measures to relax economic and political pressures on the Soviet population. Beria apparently attempted to use his police apparatus to strengthen his own position and possibly to achieve dominance in the Presidium. This crisis was resolved by his arrest in late June. There have been indications since that time that stability has not yet been reached.

The remaining sections of this study are concerned with the effects of the Stalin succession crisis on the Soviet armed forces and with the part which the armed forces played in the crisis itself.

II. Possibilities of Military Intervention in the Succession Crisis

The Historical Tradition:

Some observations are appropriate here regarding the nature of the role which the Soviet armed forces might have been expected to play in internal affairs at this moment of Russian history. Practically every available source, with the exception of some of the more imaginative columnists, warns that we should be very cautious about ascribing any great political influence or freedom of action to the Soviet armed forces of today.

Historically, the Soviet armed forces have not inherited a tradition of successful intervention in internal affairs. [redacted] three major succession crises in the history of Czarist Russia: the Time of Troubles, 1584-1613, following the death of Ivan the Terrible; the period of Palace Revolutions, 1725-1762, following the death of Peter the Great; and the Decembrist Revolt of 1825.¹ In these three crises, Russian autocracy was challenged after the death of a strong ruler by various elements who sought to share in power and to improve their own living conditions; the autocracy survived all three challenges and continued to consolidate. A feature of the Time of Troubles was the development of fragmentary military power by various groups and temporary coalitions, who attempted unsuccessfully to gain controlling power for themselves. The strong Romanov family was finally able to stabilize the situation after hatred of Polish intervention had goaded the stalemated Cossacks and Russian gentry into joining forces. The Palace Revolutions of the 18th Century were dominated by the small but influential Guards regiments, originally created by Peter the Great to protect the throne. Well-placed and closely knit, they were able to exert their strength at the top to influence the selection of four monarchs after the death of Peter. The remainder of the large army which had been built by Peter was not influential in these palace

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intrigues. The unsuccessful Decembrist revolt of 1825, a futile Guards action, was not, as its predecessors had been, part of a palace intrigue to attain limited class gains. It was an open revolt, with the avowed purpose of overthrowing autocracy. As such, it lacked sufficient organization, planning, and military and popular support to achieve success.

The period of Communist revolution and civil war of 1918-1921 was in one respect reminiscent of the Time of Troubles, with a complete fragmentation of the nine million-man army and the development of separate nuclei of military force in many parts of Russia. The stories of Kolchak and the Czechs, Kornilov, Denikin, Yudenich and Wrangel are well known. Even the Communists were surprised at the number of Czarist officers who joined Communist ranks (an estimated 48,000 were either drafted or volunteered for the Red Army between June 1918 and August 1920); many were forced to join by Trotsky's coercive methods, many others acted purely opportunistically, while some were motivated primarily by patriotism, believing that the Communists were the only group with a chance of saving Russia from foreign domination.

The Soviet period itself is devoid of significant independent action on the part of the military in time of internal crisis. The revolt of the sailors at Kronstadt in March 1921, although highly significant as the epitome of widespread popular dissatisfaction with Soviet economic and political policies, was rather isolated, lacked initiative, and, like the Decembrist revolt of 1825, suffered from its prematurity. Fedotoff White records that the rebels rejected a plan to enlarge the base of the rebellion by undertaking military operations on the mainland. They limited themselves to issuing pronouncements and defending Kronstadt. They were quickly overwhelmed.^{1/} The struggle for power between Trotsky and Stalin, reaching its height after Lenin's death in 1924, was conducted to a large extent according to the personalities of the protagonists. Stalin used all the power available to him as Party Secretary to control appointments and line up votes. Trotsky, although he was People's Commissar for War, made little use of his office in the struggle, relying primarily on the weapons of debate and agitation; he made no attempt to rally the army for a coup d'etat. He allowed the struggle to remain a political one inside the framework of the

^{1/} D. Fedotoff White: The Growth of the Red Army; Princeton 1944; page 45.

Party. The Great Purge of the late 1930's also found the armed forces in a passive role, even as their own ranks were riddled. An idea of the extent of the purge within the armed forces is provided by Japanese and former Soviet sources, who estimate that, following the execution of Tukhachevsky and other leaders in June 1937, the purge removed more than 400 officers in the positions of brigade commanders and higher, 90 per cent of the generals, 80 per cent of the colonels, and approximately 30,000 other officers, totalling about half the entire officer corps. Three of the five Red Army marshals were purged, as well as all eleven Vice-Commissars of War and 75 of the 80 members of the Supreme Military Council, including all the military district commanders.^{1/} Certainly there had developed serious differences between the group around Tukhachevsky and the Stalinist leadership. Whether or not an anti-Stalin coup was seriously planned may never be known; if so, it was nipped in the bud, and it is clear that there was no united effort on the part of the officer corps to strike back.

It can be seen, therefore, that the Soviet armed forces entered the post-Stalin period without a history of successful interference in internal political crises by the military as a single, organized element of power. Their heritage instead was a tendency toward fragmentation, splitting up and taking sides, and failure to act at all under the stimulus of crisis. As a concomitant to this generalization, it is noteworthy that a small, well-placed military group once exercised considerable influence under conditions of palace intrigue.

Restrictions on Military Freedom of Action:

Real restrictions are placed on the freedom of the armed forces to act as a unit, the most powerful being the interlocking networks of control operated within the armed services by the Party and the security police, now the MVD. These organizations operate separate chains of command, paralleling the normal army chain of command up from company or regimental level, but responsible to essentially non-military agencies. [redacted]

[redacted] there is triple-control within the army: "the invisible, autonomous political police, the open, brazen power of the Party dictatorship, and the officers, whose knowledge and figure are

1/ [redacted]

merely tolerated." The Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, to whom the political officers are responsible, is at once a directorate of this ministry and a department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. It is responsible for carrying out the will of the Party in the armed forces, accomplishing this by unceasing indoctrination of the troops, responsibility for the maintenance of morale and discipline, guidance of the activities of Party cells at the various echelons within the armed forces, and detailed reporting on the political reliability of all officers and men, regardless of rank. The Chief Directorate for Counterintelligence was officially transferred from the Ministry of Armed Forces to the MGB in 1946, thus formalizing a de facto situation. Its officers, found throughout the regimental echelon (there are staffs at the higher levels) are the successors of SMERSH, responsible for investigation and surveillance, and for liquidation of counter-revolutionary elements and enemy penetrations within the armed forces. Thus the Soviet armed forces are permeated with informers, monitors and special operatives, many of them under cover, all of them potential enemies of any group or clique seeking to develop an independent line of action on any subject.

A wealth of material attests to the influence exerted by the Party and MVD in fragmenting the Soviet armed forces as well as the population in general. Colonel Ely sums up the position of the political officer, as follows: "The political officer on the commander's staff is in effect a spy, is generally regarded as such, and is usually thoroughly hated."^{1/} Ely further states that the Russian, having accustomed himself to this constant surveillance, copes with it by adopting a personal policy of conformity. The whole system of controls and indoctrination severely limits individual initiative throughout the ranks of the armed forces, despite the efforts of the authorities to develop the double standard of flexibility in military matters and conformity in political matters.

found that many average Russians have come to adopt an attitude of opportunism, associating themselves with the winning side without regard to convictions.^{2/} This attitude has been advanced as one of the reasons that the army failed to act in its own defense during the Great Purge; younger officers found that the purge of senior officers opened up tremendous possibilities for personal advance-

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^{1/} Louis B. Ely: The Red Army Today; Harrisburg 1949; page 128.

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ment. (A popular example is the rise of N. G. Kuznetsov, now Navy chief, to command of the Pacific Fleet at the age of 37 as a result of the purge of several superiors.) Undeniably, the memory of these purges is still in the minds of the Soviet military hierarchy, and this may be a strong deterrent to any independent action. After World War II, a tendency was shown toward reassigning officers who had seen combat together, in order to destroy the feeling of comradeship which had grown up. [redacted]

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[redacted] a typically Russian expression to describe the lack of comradely solidarity and indifference to the fate of others that the system has created among military personnel: "One's shirt is nearest to one's body."

The Soviet armed forces are also split horizontally by a caste system which has developed at least since the re-introduction of military ranks for officers during the period of preparation for World War II. Colonel Ely states that "the marshals form a caste of their own and the generals form another, both being as distinct from the officer caste as the latter are from the enlisted group."^{1/} Pay and privileges now create a greater gulf between higher officers and troops than exists in many Western armies. The officers owe their privileges and high standard of living to the regime and its continued existence. In addition, the Suvorov schools, created in 1943 to train young boys from the age of nine or ten to become career officers, annually turn out a group of politically indoctrinated, highly regimented and class-conscious cadets, who will tend to harden this caste system. [redacted] there are now 28 Suvorov schools, each having an average attendance of 600. Most of the students are sons of World War II casualties, high-ranking officers and influential Communist Party members.

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Finally, the very presence in the armed forces of a high percentage of Communists, subject to Party discipline, is a factor limiting the armed forces' freedom of political action as long as Party solidarity is outwardly maintained at the top. In the post-war years, Party membership has become essential to a successful career as a Soviet military officer, and favoritism is shown to Party stalwarts in promotions and assignments. The question of which comes first, Party membership or professional success, has been raised by many students. It is generally agreed that, during the war, military competence was a much more important factor in

^{1/} Ely: op. cit.; page 115.

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an officer's career than it is today. Statistics on decorations awarded during the war provide some interesting hints on this point. A high percentage, but by no means all, of the recipients of awards were Party members. At the XIX Party Congress, F. F. Kuznetsov stated that, of the 11,000 Heroes of the Soviet Union, 7,500 (60 per cent) were Communists. Other Soviet sources indicate that an additional 18 per cent or 27 per cent were Komsomols.

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[redacted] that these percentages are in part accounted for by strong pressure to join the Party exerted upon officers and all those who won decorations; he cites the diary of a Soviet colonel who joined the Party "on suggestion" in 1942.^{1/} It has already been noted in this paper that, even today, elections to certain Party offices may be more or less automatic for persons appointed to certain key military commands.

To sum up, there is much in the recent and past history of the Soviet armed forces to limit severely their ability to act as a unit in time of internal political crisis. The armed forces as a whole must be looked upon as a relatively passive body, non-monolithic, probably not capable of being "delivered" to anyone as a unified element of political power unless the existing controls break down under circumstances far more drastic than any yet evidenced. Instead, the post-Stalin era should be studied with an eye toward discovering what effects the political changes have had on the armed forces as a whole (especially on the control mechanism operating within them), what attitudes the political leaders have displayed toward the armed forces, what cliques or groups of high-ranking military leaders have profited by the changes in the regime, and what influence these military leaders have had within a non-revolutionary framework of palace intrigue in a highly centralized state.

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III. Position of the Military after Stalin's Death

The Governmental Reorganization of March 1953:

The first official move by the Soviet leaders after the death of Stalin was the complete reorganization of the government's structure. The general effect of the reorganization was to centralize and streamline the governmental structure at the top, with a reduction of the number of ministries by about one-half and a return of the old Politburo group to direct control over key ministries. In the reorganizations of 6-15 March, the armed forces were treated in accordance with this general pattern; the War and Navy Ministries were merged into a single Ministry of Defense, and Bulganin returned to direct control as Minister. This action reversed a six-year trend toward relaxation of personal control of the armed forces ministry by the Party leaders. During the immediate postwar period, when Stalin was engaged in minimizing the battle-won popularity and independence of Soviet military leaders, he retained his position as People's Commissar of Defense and assumed the title of Generalissimo. In March 1946, the services were unified. A gradual, limited relaxation of control over the ministry may have begun some time during the next year, although not until the most popular military leader, Marshal Zhukov, had been packed off to Odessa. Stalin resigned as Minister in March 1947 and appointed in his place a loyal "political general" and old comrade, General Bulganin, who was promoted to marshal shortly thereafter. Bulganin withdrew from the post in 1949, to become Politburo member without portfolio (but still reliably reported to have general responsibility for military matters). Marshal Vasilevsky, an able staff officer, replaced Bulganin. In February 1950, the services were again separated, with Vasilevsky becoming Minister of War. The Navy regained status as a ministry, and the next year the post of minister was returned to Vice Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, who came out of his enforced retirement but did not receive his former rank of Admiral of the Fleet. The reunification of the services in March 1953 returned them to the situation existing under Bulganin in 1947-1949, tending to re-establish closer control by a top Party leader.

The neutralizing influence of this step may be related to the personal status of Bulganin himself, who at that time appeared not to be a serious contender for personal supremacy but, rather, a non-partisan representative of Soviet collective leadership. In the published listings of high Soviet officials since Stalin's death, Bulganin has regularly ranked just behind the topmost leaders; he was listed sixth in the Party Presidium on 13 March 1953 and was

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fifth on 7 November, Beria having been eliminated.

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[redacted] concludes that, within the armed forces, Bulganin cannot claim either professional or personal popularity but is considered a capable administrator who acts as watchdog for the Presidium. At the two major celebrations involving the armed forces in 1953, May Day and October Revolution Day, Bulganin took the parade and delivered the military speech; except for one year, previous practice had been to honor two different military leaders at these celebrations.

The March reorganization brought the announcement of the return of Marshal G. K. Zhukov from relative obscurity to be a First Deputy Defense Minister, an appointment which could not fail to draw wide notice and would appear to contradict evidence of attempts to tighten political control over the armed forces. Zhukov's appointment probably had both political and military implications; it would help to insure support for the government by the lower ranks of the army, and it represented the return to headquarters of a top Soviet military strategist at a time of possible danger to the nation. Zhukov, the best known of the Soviet marshals, is considered an example of an "ideal type," the anti-political professional officer. There is some question as to the truth of various colorful stories regarding Zhukov's past brushes with Presidium members, including Malenkov, Bulganin, and Voroshilov (all of whom presumably had to give at least tacit consent to Zhukov's appointment in March), but it is known that Zhukov is outspoken, blunt, and not afraid to make enemies in high places. Zhukov's opposition to political interference in military matters is well confirmed, particularly his belief--expressed publicly after the Finnish campaigns--that the power of the political officers should be strictly limited. An extremely able strategist, Zhukov headed the wartime general headquarters, the Stavka, during its entire existence from 1942 to 1946; in this post and as First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, he was directly under Stalin. It is generally believed that Zhukov's great popularity with the Soviet people was the basic cause for his relegation to command of the Odessa Military District in 1946, probably as a result of the personal decision of Stalin. A contributing factor may have been his friendly contact with Western military leaders, including General Eisenhower.

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[redacted] Zhukov's clash with Vasily Stalin

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and his own deputy for NKVD and NKGB matters. Zhukov sent unfavorable reports from Germany to Moscow about Vasily, who was recalled; but the deputy then submitted reports highly favorable to Vasily and unfavorable to Zhukov. Zhukov was recalled in March 1946, summoned before the Central Committee, disciplined for various delinquencies, and sent to Odessa.

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March to June 1946.) Another version of Zhukov's eclipse

is that Zhukov and Govorov were personal enemies, and Govorov, acting in the capacity of Inspector General, turned in a highly unfavorable report on Zhukov. It is important to note that Zhukov was not in disgrace during Stalin's lifetime, even after his removal from the Moscow scene. He appeared with Molotov at the Polish Liberation Day celebrations in July 1951, delivering a widely-reported but non-controversial speech; he was re-elected a candidate member of the Central Committee in October 1952.

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The merger of the Navy into an armed forces ministry dominated by ground force officers must have disappointed many of the naval officers who had enjoyed greater independence since 1950. It must have rankled especially to have Admiral Zakharov, chief of the Navy's political directorate, replaced on 7 March by L. I. Brezhnev, a wartime army political officer but primarily a Party functionary who had been appointed to Malenkov's enlarged Secretariat at the

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time of the XIX Party Congress.^{1/} Even the Navy newspaper, Red Fleet, was suspended and merged with Red Star on 8 April, after 14 years of publication; Red Fleet had continued to publish during the previous period of armed services unification, from 1946 to 1950. Evidence of efforts to reassure the naval leadership subsequent to the establishment of increased control may be found in the awarding of medals in April to a number of military officers, mostly navy officers, for "long and meritorious service;" the reported designation in June of former Navy Minister Kuznetsov as a First Deputy Defense Minister; Kuznetsov's promotion during the spring to his World War II rank of Fleet Admiral; and extensive, favorable publicity given in the Soviet press to Navy Day in July and to the visit of the cruiser Sverdlov to the British coronation in June.

The Period of Uncertainty in the Spring of 1953:

The months following Stalin's death witnessed a reversal of some of the unpopular policies of the Soviet government, with the iron hand removed from the top, the new leaders vying to ingratiate themselves with their people, the Satellites, and the world, and Beria making a strong bid for personal supremacy. On 27 March the amnesty brought pardon to minor civilian and military offenders, in April the largest price cut in four years was announced, and in the next two months the first indications appeared of an easing of the agricultural and consumer goods situations. The army participated in Soviet efforts to relax international tensions: in mid-March, after a British aircraft had been shot down by Soviet fighters in Germany, General Chuikov sent a most conciliatory note, which resulted in the opening of negotiations on revision of the Berlin air corridor rules (the negotiations have accomplished nothing, although they continued in desultory fashion until late 1953). The renewed Soviet propaganda theme of cooperation among nations was aided by Bulganin on May Day: after an unusually short military parade, he

^{1/} Brezhnev was later identified as a deputy to the Chief of the Chief Political Directorate of the Defense Ministry. He probably held the post until February 1954, when he was assigned by the Party to Kazakhstan. His replacement has not been identified.

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emphasized the defensive role of the Soviet armed forces, in contrast to the belligerent press releases of Soviet Army Day in February 1953.^{1/}

The most dramatic and most fantastic of these post-Stalin measures was the reversal of the Doctors' Plot, announced by Beria's MVD on 4 April. The accused were innocent, the accusers were guilty, the warned were unwarned. There was no public reaction on the part of the five military leaders previously named as intended victims, who may well have wondered whether the danger to their lives had now increased or decreased. Some information is available, however, on reactions within the ranks of the armed services.

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reversal of the Doctors' Plot was actually a great disillusionment. They had accepted the plot at its face value, as they did all government announcements, but the reversal was greeted with contempt and exasperation, because it seemed to bring the whole system into disrepute.

the reversal made Beria more hated than he was before. at this time as well as at the death of Stalin and the arrest of Beria, discussion in the ranks was severely limited: officers were authorized only to read the official communiques and to offer no personal opinion or comment, political meetings were conducted with prepared agenda received from higher levels, and political officers were instructed to report on anything that was being said. The illness and death of Stalin were accompanied by the cancellation of leaves and by orders to increase vigilance.

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^{1/} One other interesting feature of May Day 1953 was the conspicuous absence of Lt. Gen. Vasily Stalin, since 1949 commander of the Moscow air garrison. He had led the air sections of the parades until Aviation Day in 1952, on that occasion commanding a formation which spelled out "Glory to Stalin." He was not in evidence at either occasion in 1953, and his present whereabouts is unknown. At Aviation Day in 1953, the formation spelled "Glory to the USSR."

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Following the reversal of the Doctors' Plot, emphasis was on respect for legality and willingness to admit a mistake on the part of the Soviet government, which nobody believed.

Other interesting source material on propaganda fed to the Soviet troops during this period is found in the programs of Radio Volga, which broadcasts to Soviet troops in East Europe for about 14 hours daily. Most of this broadcast time is devoted to rebroadcasts of Moscow transmissions, in which the soldier hears exactly the same news and propaganda as the Russian civilian, but three hours daily are devoted to political lectures, literary programs and technical information designed specifically for the troops. It is believed that this material is written by the Party. The following significant features emerge from a study of Radio Volga broadcasts specifically intended for Soviet troops between 9 March and 15 October 1953:^{1/}

- A striking continuation of the Stalin myth, even though this theme was all but dropped by other propaganda media almost immediately after Stalin's death. The emphasis on the dead leader actually increased throughout April and May, with Radio Volga lecturers displaying a curious tendency to continue speaking of Stalin in the present tense, as if he were still alive. Stalin comment had slacked off by July, but it continued to be frequent in comparison with other media.
- Continued prominence of the vigilance theme, primarily directed at external enemies, with some stress on the need to safeguard military secrets. In keeping with this "hard" line, the troops heard considerably less of welfare and consumer goods propaganda than the general public.
- Mention of Malenkov's name considerably more often than that of any other living leader.

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- Emphasis on loyalty to the Party, the Motherland, and the government. There was constant reference to the role of the Party organization in the Army.
- Failure to emphasize present military leaders or to stimulate loyalty to military heroes of the Russian past, such as was the practice during World War II. Bulganin, Voroshilov, and Vasilevsky were the only names mentioned, and these only rarely. After April, however, considerable broadcast time was devoted to popularizing the Soviet commander as such, urging "the increased authority of commanders."

This review shows that the material prepared for the troops did not respond significantly to events, remaining notably inflexible during the entire period.

In early June, the Soviet policies of conciliation were intensified, with the compromise proposal on Korea on 8 June and the announcement of the "new course" in East Germany on the 9th. The dissolution of the Soviet Control Commissions in Germany and Austria is now considered to have been preparation for the easing of tensions in East Europe, although at the time there was speculation that the Soviet Foreign Ministry was asserting itself over the Army in the occupied areas. (One article in Taegliche Rundschau, the Soviet newspaper in East Germany, placed some of the blame for previous repressive policies on the military chief of the Control Commission, but this was not repeated.) The Control Commission in Germany was abolished on 28 May. Army General V.I. Chuikov, its chief, had his responsibilities restricted to military matters, and his former political adviser, V.S. Semenov, was made High Commissioner, later Ambassador. On 7 June Chuikov was transferred from Germany to an unnamed post in the USSR and was replaced as military commander by Col. Gen. A.A. Grechko, who had been commander of the Kiev MD. Chuikov's appearance on 7 November as commander of the Kiev MD revealed that these men had simply switched jobs. Also in June, I.I. Ilyichev, a career diplomat, assumed the duties of High Commissioner in Austria, and shortly thereafter Lt. Gen. V.P. Sviridov was replaced as military commander in Austria-Hungary by Col. Gen. S.S. Biryuzov, former commander of the Maritime MD at Vladivostok and once Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria. Sviridov has not subsequently been identified.

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One of the outstanding revelations of the East German riots of 17 June was the complete reliance on the power of the Soviet Army to maintain Communist control in East Germany. Soviet authorities reacted swiftly and efficiently, correctly evaluating the nature of the situation and calling in the troops. The first troops were actually arriving in East Berlin in the early morning of the 17th, martial law was declared at 1:00 p.m. the same day, and by the 19th a total of 25,000 Soviet troops with at least 450 tanks and self-propelled guns were estimated to be in the city.

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Soviet military units were returned from their summer training areas to more than 50 cities and towns in East Germany. In contrast, units of the East German Garrisoned People's Police were reportedly alerted but confined to their barracks on 17 June. They were not committed in Berlin until the riots had been brought under control by Soviet forces, and they did not begin to replace Soviet units in the city until mid-July. The firm but generally calm manner in which the Soviet forces handled the East German disturbances was a clear reminder to the Soviet political leadership of their capabilities as a security force and could not help but enhance the already high reputation of the Soviet armed forces among the Soviet people.

The Military and the Purge of Beria:


The exact circumstances of the removal of Beria later in June are not known, but strange developments in Moscow on the night of 27 June give rise to the strong suspicion that elements of the army were involved. The first indication that Beria had come to grief was his absence from a carefully staged tableau of Soviet political leaders which presented itself at the opera that evening. (The opera, incidentally, was "The Decembrist," dealing with the unsuccessful military coup of 1825.) Reports that there were unusual military movements in the city beginning in the late afternoon of the 27th. Several dozen tanks and military vehicles arrived in Moscow by rail at about five o'clock and apparently proceeded from the station into the city and along the boulevard leading past the Kremlin and Beria's residence. Their destination was not discovered. Additional movement of military vehicles was heard or seen during that night and on subsequent nights through 30 June. Early on the 30th, tank tracks were seen on streets in the city. Although much of this activity could have been connected

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with summer training of military units in the Moscow area, the presence of the tanks and vehicles in the center of the city, highly unusual in itself, was so closely timed with the staged hint of Beria's downfall as to make mere coincidence seem doubtful. This is not to suggest that Beria was arrested by a tank crew. Assuming, however, that he was taken into custody on or before 27 June, a show of military force in Moscow when his demise was publicly revealed could have served at once as a sign to Beria's loyal followers that resistance was futile and as a precaution against any popular disorders.^{1/}

Unfortunately, the tanks in question cannot be positively identified.



In view of the circumstances, however, and of Beria's position as MVD head, it is considered most likely that the tanks were army tanks brought in from outside the city.

Personnel of the armed forces were prominently used to help signify the completeness of Beria's disgrace and the solidarity of the government. On about 13 July, shortly after the 10 July announcement of Beria's purge, Army General A. I. Antonov, commander of the Transcaucasus MD (which includes Beria's native Georgia) addressed a special meeting of the military district at which he denounced Beria and pledged the unity of all army Communists behind the decision of the Central Committee.^{2/} This was one of the first meetings of this type to

^{1/} Although there is conflicting evidence on this point, it seems most likely that Beria's arrest occurred on 26 June, since the Presidium decree regarding his "anti-state activities," presented to the Supreme Soviet for ratification in August, was dated 26 June.

^{2/} Antonov, curiously, was not elected either member or candidate member of the USSR Central Committee in October 1952, although he commanded a key military district and was active in the Georgian Communist Party. During World War II, he had been deputy to Marshal Vasilevsky on the general staff. When Antonov was Chief of the General Staff for a brief period immediately after the end of the war, Shtemenko was his deputy.

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be held in the USSR and was the first such meeting of a military district to be publicized in Red Star. At the time, it seemed that the denunciation by the military commander in Georgia could be a warning to Beria's followers that the army was maintaining firm control over the situation in Beria's native state; subsequent events confirmed this impression.

The pledge was taken for all the armed services in a Moscow meeting which was publicized in Pravda on 16 July, under the headline "Boundless Devotion to the Communist Party." According to this article, a meeting of the Party aktiv of the Defense Ministry had "recently" been held to discuss the decisions of the Central Committee regarding the dismissal of Beria. The speakers included Bulganin, Zhukov, N.G. Kuznetsov, Sokolovsky, Budenny, Govorov, and others, but evidently not Vasilevsky or Konev. The standard resolution was then unanimously adopted, pledging "true and devoted support" to the Party, service to the cause of the Soviet people, and "determined and unconditional" fulfillment of Party and government decisions. No political leaders were specifically mentioned in the resolution.

The period of confusion at the time of Beria's purge produced a spate of rumors in Moscow, supposedly from Soviet sources, suggesting a keen awareness of the potentially important role of the military among the Soviet rank-and-file, as well as among the diplomatic community. It was at first rumored that Zhukov was under arrest, but this was quickly disproved by his appearance at a reception on 12 July. The

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The absence of both Zhukov and Vasilevsky from official functions and listings from 22 July to 8 September, including absence from Air Force Day celebrations on 23 August, gave rise to false rumors that they had been removed, but both have appeared often since, and in early 1954 were nominated as deputies to the Supreme Soviet. Reports of such rumors in Moscow tapered off after last summer.

Rumors about the Soviet army's role in politics were prevalent all over the world during the summer. Stories under London datelines claimed that a military triumvirate (Voroshilov,

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Bulganin and Zhukov) had assumed real power in the USSR, that Beria was in a military prison in Moscow, and that Konev had been arrested as a supporter of Beria. Italian, Austrian, and US newspapers carried various other "inside" stories. Such stories are not believed to have any validity regarding the actual situation in the USSR.

IV. Evidences of an Improvement in the Position of the Military

Promotions and Reassignments of High-Ranking Personnel:

Since June 1953, a number of developments have occurred which suggest a greater mobility for top military personnel, somewhat greater freedom from close control, and some increase in participation in political matters. The general impression created is one of a shift from a passive toward a more active role, beginning with the incidents of the East German riots and the Beria purge.

The feeling of increased mobility is conveyed by the number of promotions and reassignments of top commanders. The Soviet press has disclosed the promotion of two men to the rank of marshal, one to fleet admiral, one to admiral, and six to army (four-star) general since June 1953.^{1/} In general, those promoted are noted more for their professional abilities than for their political connections. For several years previously, ranks had apparently been frozen for top Soviet Army officers. The only promotions to army general between the end of World War II and 1953 occurred in 1948 (in that year four officers received the rank) and the only promotions to marshal were Sokolovsky's in 1946 and Bulganin's in 1947.

The turnover in top jobs in the Defense Ministry was also greater in 1953 than for several years past. There is now firm or probable evidence of the assignment of new persons to nine key military posts since Stalin's death, with seven of these changes revealed since last May Day. A rough comparison with recent years shows that, in 21 key jobs in the ministry, there were nine known changes in 1953 but only two in 1952, three in 1951 and none in 1950; in years prior to 1950, the known turnover was more nearly comparable to that of 1953. In addition to the Moscow MD, eleven other military districts probably have had a change in command since Stalin's death, partly as a direct result of the changes in the top jobs in the ministry.^{2/}


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Most of the changes and promotions have been in the ground forces; naval and air officers hold fewer of the top positions in the Soviet armed forces, and there does not appear to have been any freeze in rank in these two services before 1953. Within the Navy, one of the more interesting appointments was that of Vice Admiral V. A. Fokin as Navy Chief of Staff, revealed in semi-official Soviet announcements in February and May 1953, and his promotion to admiral during the summer. [redacted] Fokin was for ten years closely associated with Admiral Levchenko, a Doctors' Plot "victim," and may be a protege of Levchenko. Admiral A. G. Golovko, whom Fokin replaced as Chief of Staff, has probably taken command of the South Baltic Fleet. None of these men is a member or candidate member of the Central Committee.

Within the air forces, where there has been considerable turnover in top positions since the end of World War II, there was little known change in 1953. The announcements of Aviation Day in August revealed that Col. Gen. P. F. Zhigarev, CinC of Military Aviation, had been made a Marshal of Aviation, in a move similar to the elevation of the Navy's chief to Fleet Admiral. In addition, it has been noted that, since July, Marshal of Aviation K. A. Ver-shinin has been signing obituaries directly after Zhigarev. Ver-shinin, former Air Force chief, had been replaced by Zhigarev in 1949 and had been in obscurity since that time, although he was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee in October 1952. He is reported to be a strong opponent of ground force domination among the services.

Among the more significant reassignments are changes in three key commands in the Moscow area:

- As commander of the Moscow MD and chief of the Moscow garrison, Col. Gen. P. A. Artemev was replaced by Col. Gen. K. S. Moskalenko. Soviet press material indicates that the change



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probably occurred some time between 23 May and 22 July¹1953. This command is responsible for all Soviet Army troops in the Moscow area, with at least one rifle division and other units. They are primarily show troops, with specially selected personnel, the best equipment, and well-qualified, politically reliable officers.

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-As commandant of the city of Moscow, Lt. Gen. K. R. Sinilov was replaced by Maj. Gen. I. S. Kolesnikov, probably between 22 August and 8 September.^{1/}

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-As commander of the Kremlin Guard, Lt. Gen. of MVD N. K. Spiridonov was replaced by Maj. Gen. A. Y. Vedenin, probably between 1 May and 7 November.

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The replaced officers had all held their positions for many years, encompassing the period from at least early in World War II until after Stalin's death. Of the three, only Spiridonov is identified as an MVD man. Artemev had some MVD experience, his last known security assignment being command of an NKVD rifle division in 1939. Sinilov had been charged with preservation of order in

^{1/} As mentioned earlier, a rumor was current in Moscow during July 1953 that both Sinilov and Artemev had been relieved of their commands and arrested.

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Moscow when the Germans were at the gates of the city in 1941.^{1/}
Since their replacement, the whereabouts of these three men has not been determined.

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The unusual number of recent promotions to high rank in the Soviet armed forces has led [redacted] theorize that the promotions are connected with Zhukov's appointment as First Deputy Minister, [redacted] for the purpose of revising Soviet war plans in line with the post-Stalin governmental reorganization. The promotions, he believes, are consistent with the creation of new commands and the possible organization of large subordinate planning headquarters. This hypothesis would appear to hinge primarily on the inclusion among those promoted to army general of Biryuzov, the new commander in Austria, and M. M. Popov, commander of the Tauric MD in the Crimea. So far, however, there has been no other evidence to support the theory of enlarged commands. No known increases in size or expansions of function have occurred in the commands in Germany, Austria, or the Crimea. Also, although Sviridov had been only a lieutenant

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^{1/} The pertinent extract from Stalin's order of 19 October 1941 provides an instructive sidelight on the relationship between the army and the security forces in that time of crisis. After declaring a state of siege and martial law in Moscow, Stalin proclaimed that "the maintenance of strictest order in the city and adjacent raions has been assigned to the commandant of the city of Moscow, Maj. Gen. Sinilov, for which purpose the commandant has at his disposal the troops of internal security of the NKVD, the militia, and volunteer workers' detachments." Thus the army commander was temporarily given control over the security forces.

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In addition to the several events since June 1953 tending to increase the influence of Army leaders at the direct expense of the MVD, developments of that year reduced the position and authority of the MVD with respect to all other agencies of the Soviet government, including the Army. These developments included the Doctors' Plot fiasco, the purge of Beria, and the appointment of a new minister without Presidium status. The scope of MVD activity was reduced, at least temporarily. The awareness of this decline among Soviet rank-and-file is illustrated by evidence of consternation.

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Developments in the Mechanisms of Party Control:

With regard to relations between the Party and the armed forces, perhaps the most significant appointment of 1953 was the appointment of Col. Gen. A. S. Zheltov as head of the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. This appointment was revealed on 16 July in the public notice of the meeting of the Defense Ministry's Party aktiv, at which Zheltov reported on the Central Committee's decision to purge Beria. (The exact date of the appointment is not known; a New York Times release cleared by the Moscow censor on 16 July stated that Zheltov had held this position "for some time.") Little is known regarding Zheltov's career, except that he was once champion wrestler of the Red Army. A general officer since 1939, he served during World War II as a member of military councils in the Far East and the Ukraine. From 1945 until 1950, he was Deputy Chairman of the Soviet element of the Allied

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Control Council for Austria and was also reportedly chief of the Political Directorate of the Central Group of Forces in Austria and Hungary. In September 1950, he returned to Moscow for "other duties." After that time, his name appeared frequently on obituaries, but it is noteworthy that he was not elected a member of the Central Committee in October 1952. Zheltov appears to have been appointed over the heads of at least two logical candidates whose Party status was higher than his. One of these men, Col. Gen. F. F. Kuznetsov, had been the head of the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of War prior to Stalin's death. Kuznetsov's background is of some interest: he was active in the Army's Chief Intelligence Directorate beginning in 1938 and headed it from 1946 to 1948; in 1944, he had served on the military council of the Leningrad front under Zhdanov and Govorov; he may have been something of a protege of L. Z. Mekhlis, who had taken over the Army's political administration in the midst of the Great Purge of the 1930's, and he was a member of Suslov's committee to arrange the funeral of Mekhlis in February 1953. Kuznetsov had been elected a candidate member of the Central Committee at the XIX Party Congress and had spoken on Party affairs in the Army at the Congress.^{1/} The other logical candidate passed over by Zheltov was Maj. Gen. L. I. Brezhnev, the Party leader who had become political chief of the Navy early in March. It is likely that, even after Zheltov's appointment, Kuznetsov and Brezhnev still headed the political organizations of the army and navy. Kuznetsov signed an obituary after Zheltov on 20 October, and Brezhnev opened the Aviation Day ceremonies on 8 August, at which time his promotion to lieutenant general was revealed. Even Admiral Zakharov, replaced as navy political chief in March 1953, is apparently not in real disfavor, since on 6 November he was decorated for long service.

Changes in the Chief Political Directorate are of the utmost significance because of its responsibility for Party affairs and morale within the armed services and its direct control over the thousands of political officers within their ranks. The proper function of this whole organization has been a problem about which Communist leaders have exhibited considerable vacillation over the years. The position of Red Army Commissar was created by Trotsky's

^{1/} F. F. Kuznetsov should not be confused with Col. Gen. V. I. Kuznetsov, former chairman of DOSAAF, the Soviet paramilitary and civil defense organization. V. I. Kuznetsov was apparently replaced as DOSAAF chairman on or before 26 July 1953 by Lt. Gen. K. F. Gritchin, a wartime air defense specialist.

order in 1918, primarily to provide a mechanism for establishing close surveillance by Party stalwarts over the ex-Czarist officers who were desperately needed to win battles but whose loyalty was suspect. A resolution of the Congress of Soviets that year provided that commander and commissar should exercise dual command of the unit, with the commissar holding veto power over all decisions. In May 1919, the Political Directorate was created, to direct the work of the commissars and to serve under the Party's Central Committee. After the end of the civil war, the commander's single authority was established in the spheres of combat, supply and administration, and in the late 1920's, as the size of the army decreased and the percentage of Communist commanders increased, the responsibilities of commander and political officer were combined in most units. The Great Purge brought a complete reversal of this trend. A decree of 15 August 1937, two months after the execution of the Tukhachevsky group, re-established the equality of commissars and commanders in both the military and political phases of army life; Voroshilov is quoted as saying some time thereafter, "both the commander and the military commissar will lead their unit into action."^{1/} The undeniable shortcomings displayed by the army in the Finnish campaign were blamed in large part on the commissars; both Zhukov and Marshal K. A. Meretskov, who commanded the troops in the later stages of the Finnish war, publicly criticized the system. In August 1940, a few months after Timoshenko replaced Voroshilov as People's Commissar of Defense, the system of dual command was abolished and the political commissars became deputy commanders for political affairs (called "zampolits"). In the disastrous first days after the German attack in 1941, however, the commissars and dual command were once again revived, to curb desertions and low morale. This was the period in which commissars were ordered to shoot commanders whose loyalty or determination showed any sign of flagging; one student has commented that the response of the Party to the crisis was to strengthen its "most loyal phalanx" within the army.^{2/} On 9 October 1942, the system reverted to the pattern of political officers subordinate to military commanders, a pattern which has been maintained at least on paper ever since. The abolition of the commissars in 1942 occurred two months after Gen. A. S. Shcherbakov became head of the Chief Political Directorate. The timing of this action indicates that it probably represented an effort to increase military efficiency and morale at a crucial moment

^{1/} White: op. cit.; page 398.

^{2/} Merle Fainsod: How Russia is Ruled; Cambridge 1953; page 407.

at the end of the long retreat prior to the first major Soviet offensive. One source states that Zhukov demanded curtailment of the power of the political officers for the defense of Stalingrad.

Morale vs. Security in the Soviet Army in 1953:

As World War II drew to a close, the political apparatus regained some of its former power. The encroachment of political officers on the position of commanders became so flagrant that, according to one defector, a decree was issued in August 1951 re-emphasizing the "undivided authority" of military commanders and reprimanding the political officers for their arrogant attempts to usurp authority. The XIX Party Congress speech by Vasilevsky, citing recent measures to strengthen the authority of commanders, plus Radio Volga's subsequent emphasis on unity of command, lend credence to this defector's statement. The source added that the same order demanded stricter compliance with army regulations and enforcement of military discipline; in effect, therefore, it told political officers to get out of the commanders' business and to crack down in their own field. In Germany, this directive reportedly produced a series of bulletins and orders tightening regulations, intensifying political indoctrination of personnel, restricting the sale of liquor to military personnel, and re-emphasizing the order forbidding fraternization with the local population. The implementation of this new policy is well confirmed; beginning in mid-1951, intensive measures were taken throughout occupied Europe to isolate Soviet military personnel and installations, including the movement of headquarters from urban to rural areas, building of fences around installations, replacement of local civilian employees with Soviet nationals, and strict enforcement of the ban on fraternization. The general effect of this policy was to make barracks life for the troops in occupied Europe seem very like being in prison. Troops were scarcely allowed out of their compounds except in escorted groups, fraternization was forbidden, and what little free time there had been was filled with more political lectures. Most sources agree that, by 1953, although desertions had been cut down, morale among the men and officers in occupied Europe was low; morale had been sacrificed for security.

Following Beria's purge, many of the oppressive restrictions on Soviet troops in East Europe began to be lifted. On two occasions in July, Soviet officers in Berlin attended receptions in civilian clothes; when questioned about this, they replied that they were now permitted to wear civilian clothes when off duty. Beginning about 1 August, [redacted] that Soviet troops could leave their quarters during off-duty hours and that many were

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making excursions into towns near the training areas to attend dances and visit the taverns. One report stated that 10 per cent of the troops were being given passes each evening, with enlisted men observing a one a.m. curfew and officers allowed out overnight. Fraternization became prevalent in Germany during August and in Austria after about 1 September. Several reports of early September indicated that local civilians would again be employed at Soviet installations. In late October, the families of Soviet officers of the rank of lieutenant and above began to arrive in East Germany from the USSR, and it was rumored that teachers would soon arrive to set up schools for their children.

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(After mid-1948, only high-ranking officers and security personnel had been permitted to have their families in occupied Europe, and no provision was made for schooling.) At the same time, however, there was evidence that Soviet officers would have to serve longer tours of duty in the occupied areas:

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a Soviet officer in Austria said his scheduled return to the USSR had been cancelled only a few hours before his departure and that he would have to remain for three more years. It was suggested that lengthened tours of duty were an economy measure, but the saving would not seem to outweigh the cost of transporting families and providing housing for them, which is a Soviet expense in Austria now that the USSR has assumed the cost of maintaining its occupation forces.

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There is also some evidence that a more liberal attitude was adopted toward the problem of military security in the summer of 1953. On 22 June travel restrictions in the USSR were relaxed slightly and many areas previously closed to foreigners were declared open; this relaxation was partially rescinded in November, when a few areas were closed again. On 6 September the Ministry of Defense published the annual order for the routine call-up and demobilization of conscript classes, the first such public notice since 1948, and a Tass announcement of 16 October referred to the demobilization of soldiers of a specific Soviet tank division. Bulganin's 7 November speech revealed the completion of autumn maneuvers. These developments suggest a more realistic security policy, allowing the revelation of non-sensitive military information.

The Greater Influence of the Military Point of View:

Obviously the measures relaxing security controls over the troops were not the sole responsibility of the Army or of the Chief Political Directorate. They are consistent with the general effort to improve living conditions for the Soviet people, followed since Stalin's death by the new regime; but it is pertinent to our problem that the relaxation of controls on the troops bears directly on the ability of the political officers and the MVD agents to keep close tabs on all personnel and to press their political indoctrination. Although there has been no evidence of any change in the political officers' responsibility for detailed reporting on political reliability, a man with free time, in civilian clothes and allowed to go where he pleases, is hardly susceptible to close surveillance. It seems clear that this is essentially a military man's solution to the problem of army morale--the soldiers were to be treated like soldiers instead of being cloistered like a bunch of children, and the power of the political officer and the MVD man over them was reduced. Likewise, the more realistic approach to matters of security would appear to reflect a military man's point of view toward that problem. Several appointments of past months also suggest that a military point of view was taken into consideration, particularly those appointments in which professional army officers were placed in positions formerly held by Party or MVD personnel.

Is there support for the inference that a military man's point of view can exist in the USSR, shared by some members of the professional officer caste and possibly even by some political officers? It was cautioned earlier that the armed services should not be considered a monolithic unit and probably do not constitute an autonomous source of political power. In spite of the tendency toward fragmentation and lack of initiative, can at least some persons within the services express a military point of view in competition with other branches of government, especially the Party and the MVD, within the limits imposed by the prevailing system? It is not believed that Party membership is in itself a deterrent to the existence of a military point of view; in fact, H. J. Berman, in commenting on the high percentage of Party members in the officer corps, has raised the cogent point that, while this may constitute a threat to the military tradition, "it may equally constitute an infiltration of the military mentality into the Party itself."^{1/} Military terminology was of course commonly used by Party leaders to describe their political and economic "campaigns"

^{1/} In his article, "The Basic Facts about Russia's Army;" The Washington Star, 31 August 1953.

since before the Revolution. Fedotoff White studied the history of the political commissars in the civil war period, commenting that the "ancient rhythm of army life," the planning of strategic maneuvers and the administrative details of a detachment, held a strong attraction for these energetic young Communists, who therefore often tended to neglect their own official responsibilities.^{1/} "Political work among the greenhorn Communists in the ranks, who were fumbling with the basic tenets of Marxism, was a tame pastime in comparison with the 'glory' of the battlefield and the exercise of authority in the everyday life of the camp." Even Gen. Jan Gamarnik, who headed the army's political directorate and who committed suicide in June 1937, was implicated in the Tukhachevsky affair.

Strong ties presumably developed among top military commanders out of the experience of World War II, when the privilege of rank was great and professional military men had great influence on national policies. The roster of Zhukov's wartime comrades-in-arms, for example, includes Konev, Rokossovsky, Timoshenko, Govorov, Malinovsky, Voronov, Vasilevsky, Chuikov, Kurasov, Sokolovsky and Popov. Men who were directly subordinate to some of the top military leaders during the wartime and immediate postwar years have in some cases emerged in key positions more recently. For example, Army General V. V. Kurasov, head of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy (roughly comparable to the US Army War College), Col. Gen. A. S. Zhadov, head of the Frunze Military Academy (comparable to the US Command and General Staff College), and Zheltov, new head of the Chief Political Directorate, all served under Marshal Konev in Austria. The present positions of these three generals are influential in the molding of Soviet military thought.

As has been suggested, those individuals who hold a military point of view might be expected to be less rigid in their thinking than doctrinaire Party officials, and less reliant on indoctrination and surveillance as a solution to their problems. Likewise, they might be less morbidly concerned with security and secrecy than those whose thinking had been conditioned by years of training and service in the MVD and its predecessor organizations. Like the members of any professional group, those holding the military point of view might be impatient with interference and meddling by non-professionals in what they considered vital problems affecting Soviet defenses. Their attitudes regarding such problems might be "non-political" or even "anti-political," as very probably in the case

^{1/} White: op. cit.; page 89.

of Zhukov. The non-political or anti-political officers might have a more realistic, hard-headed approach to certain national problems and might display more independence of thought regarding solutions than would "political generals" such as Bulganin. Such an attitude in the field of national defense affairs might carry over into the field of Soviet international relations. It thus could be speculated that the somewhat increased flexibility in foreign policy shown by the Soviet regime since Stalin's death has been fully supported by the military point of view in the USSR. It must be cautioned, however, that there is no really useful current information on the formulation of Soviet foreign policy and that most opinions regarding the attitudes of top Soviet military men toward the West are mere suppositions. In the absence of reliable information, it would be extremely dangerous to assume that the military point of view in the USSR is more friendly toward the West than are other Soviet points of view today, or, conversely, that the military mind is any more determined to seek war with the West.

Summary of the First Year:

A review of the significant developments of the period from October 1952 through October 1953 affecting the political position of the Soviet armed forces shows a progression through several distinct phases. In the months preceding Stalin's death, there was evidence of the participation of certain army leaders or factions in political maneuvering. The period of the post-Stalin struggle between Malenkov and Beria, from March until June, was a time of outward passivity on the part of the Soviet military leaders, with an increase in political control over them. After June, however, high officers of the armed forces enjoyed somewhat greater mobility, professional officers were placed in important security assignments, and greater consideration was given to a military point of view regarding questions of morale and security within the armed forces. It seems quite likely that these changes resulted in part from the increased influence of Zhukov and others of an "anti-political" frame of mind. The armed forces leadership participated to some extent, possibly only verbal, in the removal of Beria, and it seems reasonable to conclude that the present Party leadership bought military acquiescence or support for its control by giving the professional military men greater freedom within their own establishment. There was no clear evidence, however, of any drastic change in the formal relationships between the armed forces and any other branch of the Soviet government. The alliance between top army and Party leaders was probably an uneasy one; Zhukov and the military point of view were hardly on what would be called close terms with Malenkov and the other top Soviet leaders.

V. Toward the Future--7 November 1953 and After

October Revolution Day:

The last anniversary of significance to all the Soviet armed forces in 1953 was the October Revolution celebration. The press build-up described the US in language noticeably sharper than that of the previous few months, although the speeches by Voroshilov and Bulganin were comparatively low in anti-American content. The military portion of the parade on 7 November took only about 20 minutes, and as on May Day of 1953 no armor was displayed. Military men appearing at the parade were shown in a Pravda picture in the following order, reading away from Malenkov--Bulganin, Zhukov, Govorov (slightly to the rear), Vasilevsky, Sokolovsky, N. G. Kuznetsov, Zhigarev (also to the rear), Budenny. A notice of a diplomatic reception on the same day listed Vasilevsky immediately after Bulganin. The notices of the 7 November festivities, as well as other official releases of the fall and winter of 1953, reveal that recent appearances have been made by all the military officers listed as potential Doctors' Plot "victims" with the exception of Shtemenko.

Ambassador Bohlen's description of a reception given on the night of 7 November by Foreign Minister Molotov provides a fascinating tidbit, possibly indicative of the uneasiness of the present alliance between army and Party leaders. The hand-picked group at Molotov's table included Soviet Presidium members, Communist Chinese and East German representatives, and the US, British and French Ambassadors. Numerous toasts were proposed to "peace" by the Russians, after which Ambassador Bohlen proposed a toast to "justice," which "seemed to animate the Soviet officials." At about this time, Bulganin had to leave the table. Molotov then sent for Zhukov to take Bulganin's place, ignoring Vasilevsky, who was having buffet supper in the same room. When asked to propose a toast, Zhukov stated that he wished to support the toast to justice, despite Mikoyan's "irritated" urging that he think up a toast of his own. Later, Molotov proposed the healths of the military, who had arranged the day's parade, expressing the hope that they would confine themselves to parades. Ambassador Bohlen reports that, although Molotov was obviously speaking of parades in contrast to war, this toast "did not seem to please Zhukov especially." Zhukov was clearly not on intimate terms with the Presidium members at the table and took little pleasure in the proceedings.

Military Participation on Beria's Trial Board:

On 23 December, Izvestia announced that a special session of the Supreme Court, under the chairmanship of Marshal I. S. Konev, had tried and convicted Beria and six accomplices on charges of treason and that the death sentence had been carried out. On the face of it, the appointment of a high military man as chairman of this court is another indication that Army leaders are now active participants in, and supporters of, the policies of the present Soviet regime. Membership on the court of a Soviet Army marshal may be partially explained by reasons of protocol, since Beria had held the rank of marshal since 1945. The sentence specified that the defendants were stripped of "all their military titles and awards." This was not essentially a military tribunal, however; for this reason it seems that, as chairman, Konev was given unusual precedence over a high Party figure, alternate Presidium member N. M. Shvernik, who was a member of the court.

Regarding Konev, the most obvious point of interest that comes to mind is the fact that he was named as a Doctors' Plot "victim," although he had been considered a loyal, personal friend of Stalin. He was one of seven top military leaders chosen to guard Stalin's coffin but was absent from official functions covered in the Soviet press from that time until September. Using the hypothesis that Malenkov was behind the Doctors' Plot announcement, that it was in part a warning to Konev and others, and that Beria later reversed it, it can be speculated that Konev's appearance on the trial board reflects his shift from opposition to support of Malenkov. On the other hand, membership in the group convicting Beria may have been considered an undesirable assignment for any military or civilian leader, because of the possibility that it might backfire later, and Konev may have accepted it only reluctantly.

Another member of the court was Army General K. S. Moskalenko, who became commander of the Moscow MD at about the time of Beria's arrest. His membership is another hint that military forces in the Moscow area participated in the arrest and imprisonment of Beria. If the presence of Konev and Moskalenko on the court indicates active military participation in the policies of the present regime, it must also be noted that Ambassador Bohlen has commented that the court included representatives of the Army, the trade unions, the MVD and the Georgian branch of the Communist Party, suggesting an effort to involve representatives of a number of institutions in the decisions.

A curious note regarding the present influence of the armed

forces is found in an omission from the court's report. The State Prosecutor's indictment of 17 December specifically accused Beria, among other things, of weakening the defensive capacity of the USSR. The Court's report of 24 December said that all preliminary investigations and accusations had been "completely confirmed;" but, in the detailed listing of Beria's criminal acts which followed this statement, Soviet defenses were not mentioned.

Other Recent Developments:

As pointed out earlier, the relaxation of controls over the troops in occupied Europe was consistent with the general effort to improve Soviet living conditions. An illustration of the close relationship between some policies of the government and the Army is a measure adopted by the Supreme Soviet on 26 November 1953, which will influence both civilians and military personnel. A decree of that date rescinded a 1947 decree which made marriages between Soviet citizens and foreigners illegal; the 1947 decree was thought to have been partly directed at Soviet military personnel abroad. Ambassador Bohlen commented that the action of 26 November seemed connected with efforts to liquidate some of the most inflexible and damaging aspects of Stalin's policy, the advantages of which were not commensurate with the losses involved. In January 1954, it was reported that a decree permitting marriage to Austrians was read to Soviet troops in the Vienna area.

It is noteworthy, however, that some of the liberal Soviet policies initiated during the summer were partially reversed by the end of the year. On 14 November, five new areas of the USSR were closed to foreigners; this action reversed the trend toward easing travel restrictions which had appeared in June. During the autumn, various instances of the abuse of increased privileges were reported from the East European areas occupied by Soviet troops. Disorders and crimes were reported, and several sources stressed the unfavorable reaction of the German population to the Soviet soldiers' attempts at fraternization. Curfews, off-limits areas, escorts for enlisted men on passes, and in some cases restrictions to barracks were imposed, and by late December it was apparent that restrictions on the troops had been partially re-instituted in both Germany and Austria. The impression conveyed by the reports, however, was that increased freedom for the troops was still the general rule, with exceptions where security required it, whereas before the summer tight controls over the troops had been the rule.

Dependents of Soviet officers arrived in Germany daily during

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December, and by January 1954 they had occupied at least 4,000 family dwelling units there. The influx continued despite considerable discontent on the part of German civilians in areas where many quarters were requisitioned. USAREUR estimated that, by the end of January, 18,000 - 20,000 dependent groups had arrived in East Germany. In Austria, where housing was apparently requested and paid for rather than requisitioned, few dependents had arrived by the end of 1953. Their arrival was suspended temporarily about the first of the year. The explanation given to the officers was reported to be a shortage of housing, and one source stated that renovation of apartments for dependents was under way at 22 locations in Austria, with 1 March 1954 the scheduled completion date for most quarters. Preparations for the arrival of Soviet officers' dependents have also been reported under way in Poland and Hungary. At the same time, an accumulation of information from fairly reliable sources has led G-2 to accept reports that the tour of duty for Soviet officers in occupied Europe has been lengthened from three to five years. The explanation for this has not been learned by any of the sources.

The question of the Army-MVD relationship remains open, and the relationship itself may still be in a state of flux within the USSR. Various rumors have had it that the Army has taken over many of the police functions of the MVD, particularly in the Moscow area, but these stories are not supported

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